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In this essay, I will argue that the most severe short

.

coming of United States foreign policy toward Central America
has been the lack of a sustained effort to foster conditions
for genuine democratization in the Isthmus.

Viewed in a

long, historical perspective, this is as serious a flaw as
are attempts to destabilize leftist regimes and support
rightist dictatorships in the region.
The demonology of contemporary debate about Central
America offers considerable evidence for why this has been
the case.

One need only examine the discourse on Central

America to realize the fact that extant visions of the con
flict incorporate some superficial assumptions uncritically.

"

Supposedly dire economic conditions and/or agitation by
foreign actors are at the root of the conflict.

Basically,

the arguments boil down to poverty and / or Communism.

If

either is correct, the task ahead is nearly impossible be
cause, to complicate matters more, the United States is
blamed for having done too much/too l i ttle to eradicate them.
I will also argue that, unless we revise and replace
these with more realistic assumptions, we will not be able
to evolve a more effective policy toward Central America.
For in order to be efficacious, that policy must be grounded
on a better understanding of the nature of Central American
capitalism, of the nature of the process of democratization
itself, and of the kinds of situations in which United
States policy could and should make a difference.
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In Search of Theoretical Focus
A. The Role of the United States
One particular feature of Central American societies,
in contrast with the larger countries of South America, is
the more profound and sustained impact of the United States
on their historical evolution.

Their proximity to the

u.

S.

mainland, coupled with their "backwardness" has made these
societies more open and vulnerable to the impact of initia
tives running the gamut from well-intentioned paternalism
to unabashed imperialism.

These initiatives constitute a

formidable historical precedent, weighing heavily on the
credibility of our efforts to evolve an efficacious policy
toward Central America at the present time.
The search for a viable United States policy toward
Central America can neither obviate nor dwell excessively
on these precedents.

For better or worse, the United States

remains an exceedingly crucial actor and is viewed as such
by all relevant political forces.

It is no exaggeration to

say that few political movements and initiatives are launched
in the Isthmus without anticipating the reaction of the
United States.

This fact is compounded into the political

calculations of the forces vying for supremacy.

Rightists

seek to legitimize themselves emphasizing their supposed
ideological affinity with the United States and presenting
themselves as the only realistic alternative to Communist
insprured subversion.

Leftists seeking to widen the limited

political space available to them try to present their case

•

3

directly to Congress and the media in order to counter efforts
by successive administrations to isolate them and minimize
their importance.

•

Acknowledging this should not, on the other hand, lead
us to believe that the U.S. can resolve the Central American
crisis to its satisfaction by an optimal combination of
resources and willpower.

The United States has not been in

vo l ved in every major historical event in Central America.
Professor John Peeler has shown how Costa Rican democracy .
was established and is maintained through a self-conscious
agreement among the local political elite. 1

The repressive

reformist regime of the Salvadoran military owed very little
to the United States until the coup of October 1979.
Neither has the United States been omnipotent.

In a

recent essay, Professor John A. Booth offers us a list of
the initiatives that the United States has not been able to
carry out in Central America since 19 77.

The list is long

and it includes a number of important initiatives. 2

One

leader of the Salvadoran FDR confided to me that very signif
icant United States initiatives in hi s country have been de
feated by two of the parties to the conflict.

He meant to

say that, while the U. S.-assisted Sa l vadoran Army has not
been able to defeat the guerrillas, t h e right wing has
effectively gutted efforts to improve human rights and
bring about the rule of law.
•

We were unable to produce a

gradual political liberalization in Ni caragua.
dynasty remained adamantly opposed to it.

The Somoza

We are not having
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much better luck with the Guatemalan military.

In essencer

therefore, we are not dealing with a bunch of hapless
"natives" down there.
Recognizing that our foreign policy lacks divine powers
should not make us abandon the field to "cultural pessimism . "
Even if our ability to make a positive contribution is
limited, we should not refrain from trying to influence the
outcome of the Central American crisis.
B. What is Really in Crisis in Central America?
Sociologist Peter Berger reduces the theories seeking
to explain the facts of poverty and wealth of nations ~o two:
the theory of modernization and the theory of imperialism.
Each serves to describe and legitimize one of the two basic
forms that the state may · assume in the mod~rn era:
ism or socialism.

capital

Each has its own myth:

the myth of growth

and the myth of revolution, respectively.

Each describes its

r i val in terms of an elaborate, pejorative vocabulary.
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We

must be careful not to assume that myths and rhetoric are a
substitute for serious analysis.

We must also make an effort

to incorporate the more valuable insights of each, keeping
in mind Professor Mark Rosenberg's advice against viewing
Central American reality in terms of paired opposites but
also bearing in mind that most of the relevant actors in
Central America subscribe to one of the versions of these
.
'
4
two b asic
para d igms.

There are other, less sophisticated economic interpre
tations of the Central American crisis.

The most popular

.

1
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is that poverty and/or the deterioration of the material
conditions of life are fostering revolution in Central
America.

•

This perhaps is the case but, if poverty alone were

capable of triggering revolutionary situations, humankind
would not have enjoyed a moment of respite.

No government

in recorded history can be credited with the elimination
of social inequality, much less poverty.

As a matter of

fact, since the Industrial Revolution, the most important
domestic task for government has been how to manage the
contradiction between individual political freedom and
socioeconomic equality.

Capitalism and socialism are alter

native ways to manage this basic contradiction.

I would

suggest that it is not , poverty itself but the manner in

•.

which the state utilizes public power to confront this
problematic that may create a pre-revolutionary situation,
and that most of the capitalist states of Central America
have not given a good account of themselves in this regard.
We have to ask whether the crisis in Central America
is the result of severe structural flaws or is merely a
result of international economic disequilibria that require
marginal, incremental adjustments.

More specifically, are

we witnessing a crisis of the capitalist state in Central
America or a particularly perverse instance of the cyclical
crises of capitalism?
British economist Victor Bulmer-Thomas makes two im
•

portant contributions to the ongoing scholarly reappraisal
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of the causality of the present crisis.

Looking at the long

term barter terms of trade of Central American commodities
since the 1929s, he takes issue with the Prebisch-Singer
thesis of a secular decline, and shows that economic growth
has produced develqpment in Central America.

He concludes

that "political and social instability is called into
question because of the success of export-led growth rather
than despite it (his emphasis).

The problem, according to

Bulmer-Thomas, is that the theory of comparative advantage
does not say anything about how the gains of trade shall
be distributed.

5

I have been very intrigued about the kinds of differences that one finds between the more--El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Nicaragua--and the less--Costa Rica and Honduras--vio lent countries in the region.

Is there a particular syndrome

or style of development that accompanies the evolution of
the more violent countries?

Recently I looked at indicators

of economic performance--GDP rates of growth, the performance
of the agricultural and industrial sectors, the consumer
price index, the balance of payments, the level of indebted
ness and foreign investment--and also at structural indicators-
basically land tenure patterns, quality of life indicators,
and employment and income data.

The data covered the period

of 1960-1979, that is, the time during which the present
crisis could have been brewing. 6
The performance indicators cannot be used to identify
one country that stands out in terms of an overall picture

7

of economic stagnation.

To be sure, Nicaragua offers a pro

file of economic trouble for 1975-1979, but this was very
much the result of ongoing political instability and not the
"

cause of that instability.

There was no obvious collapse of

any of the crucial economic sectors, inflation was very low
by Latin American standards, and the balance-of-payments
situation was deteriorating, with Costa Rica seemingiy the
country most affected by this.

In reality, the picture was

relatively mixed, with Nicaragua second to Costa Rica in a
number of indicators registering adverse economic conditions.
The economic crisis had not been in full swing during the
time when Anastasio Somoza and Carlos Humberto Romero were
overthrown in Nicaragua and in El Salvador.
The structural indicators suggest that, while there is
much concentration of land in the authoritarian coffee
republics (El Salvador and Guatemale), concentration is also
a fact of life in democratic Costa Rica.

However, concentra

tion of land is compounded, especially in the case of El
Salvador, by a high ratio of land utilization.

This means

that the kinds of factors identified by Malthus and Ricardo
a long time ago complicate matters in El Salvador regardless
of the pattern of land tenure.

Needless to say, there are

severe income discrepancies among the families engaged in
agriculture in the five countries.

These were more pro

nounced in the "violent" countries but also detectable in
the other two.

Finally, the presence of foreign agricultural

"enclaves" did not seem to tilt the scale one way or another.
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What I distilled from this evidence is that there is
not a unique combination of structural characteristics that
set the more violent countries apart.

As a matter of fact,

the country combining a group of seemingly adverse charac
teristics, that is, the quintessential "banana republic,"
turns out to be Costa Rica.
The structural roots of the present crisis must be
sought in how the Central American states have managed the
contradiction between economic freedom and social inequality.
Professor Bulmer-Thomas suggests that the present crisis
"has much more to do with the breakdown of social relations
within the agricultural sector as a result o·f the specific
way in which the export-led model has operated."

7

Professor

Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr.,. reminds us - that "ca l culated terror
has been an established method of control of the rural pop
ulation (of Central America) for five centuries. 118

Historian

Thomas P. Anderson views the present conflict as "the result
of the increasingly desperate struggle of certain entrenched
groups to retain land, prestige, and power at any price. 119
The dispube may be about "economics," that is, about the
form that the capitalist state has assumed in Central America.
C. A Political Economy Interpretation
What separates more clearly the less from the more
peaceful countries of Central America is the nature of their
political regimes and, more to the point, the presence of
very combative "reactionary" coalitions in the more violent
countries.

The political regimes which these coalitions
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have helped create can be described as "riactionary despotism."
The deterioration and breakdown of these regimes have created
the present crisis in Central America .
•

Reactionary despotism is one variant of what Barrington
Moore, Jr., has called "the conservative route to moderniza
tion."

According to Moore, the emergence of a system of

labor-repressive agriculture--as in the "violent" Central
American countries--creates conditions in which able leaders
can drag along the less perceptive reactionary elements
concentrated in the landed upper classes and establish a
powerful bureaucratic apparatus and an efficient machine
of law and order.
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Most of the oligarchic republics of

Central America had their origins in the liberal revolutions
that swept the Isthmus in the 1870s.

Their "liberal"

orientation set them in pursuit of a comparative advantage
through the export trade of primary commodities.

The pre

vailing positivist philosophy did not make much of the
exclusion of the lower strata from effective individual
participation in politics and in the market.

As was the

case in other Latin America~ countries, control of the labor
market became an uppermost concern.

In El Salvador and in

Guatemala, it was possible to implement very effective
controls over the rural labor force.

In Costa Rica, Honduras,

and Nicaragua, that control could not be implemented very
effectively.

The seeds of reactionary despotism were

latent in these oligarchic republics but, as long as the
"liberal" landowning element that dominated them was not
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confronted by the land and the labor questions, they did not
have to choose between their democratic elitism and their
authoritarian capitalism.

The Crisis of the Depression

forced the issue, and they opted for the latter.
Following the Great Depression, many capitalist states
reformed themselves, adopting Keynesianism and welfare eco
nomics.

More importantly perhaps they incorporated working

and lower class elements previously excluded from the market
and from effective citizenship.

The Marxist prophecy missed

its mark as capitalism became more democratic and legitimate,
incorporating through a new social pact many who had been
left out.
During the Great Depression, most of the oligarchic
republics of Central America were replaced by personalistic
military dictatorships, the traditional landed element lost
direct control of the government, and a new division of
labor emerged between the armed forces and the oligarchy.
The military kept the land and labor questions out of the
policy agenda.

The oligarchy managed the economic model.

Michael Novak has described democratic capitalism
as a composite of (1) an economic system based on markets,
incentives, and private property;

(2) a political system

in some measure based on rights, the pursuit of individual
happiness and institutions of due process; and (3) a moral
cultural system based on pluralism and liberal values.
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At present, Belize and Costa Rica are the only Central
American states that meet the terms of Novak's operational
definition.

.
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By contrast, reactionary despotism may be defined as "an
exclusionary political regime in which a coalition of landowners, and industrialists and financiers closely related
to them, seek to manipulate public authority to legitimize
and defend their control of the economy, in which potential
•

and actual opponents of the regime are denied citizenship,
and in which cooptation and passive obedience replace the
active consent of the population." 12

The primary objective

of the coalition is to preserve a system of privilege, which
they believe can only be maintained through an authoritarian
form of capitalism.
Regardless of the material conditions of life, the
functional imperatives of reactionary despotism are on a
collision course with the agenda of democratic transition
in Central America.
•

The reactionary coalition seeks to

prevent the emergence of effective suffrage, to avoid any
linkage between the suffrage and substantive questions of
economic policy, and to disarticulate any intermediary
institutions expressing the demands of other groups and
classes.

The reactionary coalition operates to maintain

arbitrary rule, to prevent the replacement of arbitrary
rules by just and rational ones, and to refuse to give a
share in the making of rules to the underlying population.
Speaking of the Salvadoran case, Professor Stephen
Webre suggests that the "liberals" (of the reactionary
•

coalition} essentially believe that the state should be
.
13
weak and passive.

The problem is that, historically,

12
they have shown a steadfast willingness to use violence to
make sure that that remains the case.

Reactionary despotism,

in sum, is a variety of authoritarian capitalism.
D. The Politics of Democratic Transition
One initial problem confronting anyone trying to promote
a transition to democracy is the relative dearth of theory.
Although the more contextually sensitive versions · of the
theory of modernization speak of "crises of development,"
utilitarian social science is poorly prepared to cope with
the intellectual, ethical, and practical issues of the
problematic of authoritarian deterioration and breakdown.
The theory of imperialism, by contrast, offers a revolutionary
praxis which prescribes the utilization of violence in these
· kinds of situations.

We have very c~ear notions of the

functional requisites for democratic stability, of the difficult
and long progression toward democracy in Western societies,
and a few case studies about recent instances of democratic
transition.
Observing recent cases of democratic transition in
Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ecuador, Peru, the Dominican
Republic, Argentina, and hopefully Brazil, one may conclude
that a process of political transition, if it is to result
in a democratic outcome, must successfully address a four
fold agenda of (1) restoration or instauration of a state of
law,

(2) constitutional revision,

(3) implementation of an

electoral process, and (4) actual transfer of power.
process moves along a series of confrontations between

The

13
aperturists and obstructionists, and the latter must be
neutralized to bring about a resolution favorable to democ
ratization.
During the implementation of the agenda of transition,
socioeconomic issues continue to polarize and increase tensions

•
among participants.

However, the more relevant aspects of

the agenda of transition are focused on the willingness and
ability of the government to restore the rule of law, guaran
tee the physical integrity of the citizenry, a-nd put an end
to arbitrary rule.

This is indispensable to lend credence

and legitimacy to the project of transition and to engage
the participation of many actors previously excluded from
the political process.
Unfortunately, the deterioration of reactionary despot
ism in Central America is taking place under very adverse
conditions, exacerbated by the desperate attempts of the
reactionary coalitions to re-equilibrate the regime and
prevent the transition.

In Nicaragua, Somoza had to be

brought down by a popular insurrection.

In El Salvador,

the transition has evolved into a civil war, and the politi
cal process is stalemated by a military standoff and the
fact that a broad aperturist coalition is yet to emerge to
defeat the violent obstructionism of the Right.

In Guate

mala, a series of attempts are being made to re-equilibrate
reactionary despotism.

•

The chances for the emergence and

consolidation of democratic regimes are obviously not that
good.
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By democratic I mean "a regime in which the government
utilizes its public powers within the constraints imposed by
responsible--meaning accountable and responsive--institutions
which help prevent the systematic and severe deprivation of
basic human rights.

Democratic regimes have taken root in

a relatively broad cultural and geographic spectrum, although
the majority of these regimes are within that entity that we
call the West.

Michael Novak reminds us that "apart from

free capitalist economic systems--mixed economies to be sure-
there are on this planet no examples of free political
systems. 1114
Mindful of this incontrovertible fact,

lacking rela

tively clear precedents, and unable to improvise the structural
precondition~ ·for a democratic ~onsolidation, United States
foreign policy has been, at best, inconsistent when con
fronted by deteriorating authoritarian regimes.
In a penetrating and much-debated article, Ambassador
Jeane Kirkpatrick argued for restraint in these situations.
She wrote about the certain risks entailed by attempts to
reform authoritarian regimes in traditional societies held
together by fragile patrimonial links controlled from above
by a personalist dictator.

The case of Iran showed that,

indeed, her warnings could not be taken lightly.
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Professor

Howard Wiarda has written frequently and eloquently about
the moral-cultural roots of Latin American authoritarianism.
His essays provide ample testimony of the fact that reaction
ary conservatives in Latin America do not share the ethical
premises of democratic capitalism. 16

15
However, I would like to point out that the reactionary
coalitions of Central America are neither held together by
a patrimonial figure nor are they composed of pre-modern,
religiously motivated opponents of modernization.

In

addition, reactionary conservatives are not democratic

•

capitalists~

As defined above, democracy is the politics

in which power is not abused and, unless we look at cases
of cultural suicide, it is hard to find a majority of people
anywhere who are in favor of abuse of power against them
selves.

To promote democracy, as defined above, does not

imply the folly of trying to remake the world in our image.
In Central America, the continued onslaught against
moderate and progressive democrats has created a vacuum.
t

This is the result of a strategy through which _the elements
of the reactionary coalitions are tryi ~g to polarize the

t

situation even further, to present us with the unsavory
choice between "free enterprise" and "Communism." There
fore, the issue is not whether we may precipitate a catas
trophe by our imprudent and ill-conceived initiatives.
The issue is whether United States policy can prevent the
reactionary coalition f~om liquidating the chances for
democratization.
In Central America, as elsewhere, a process of tran
sition to democracy cannot take place without the effective
neutralization of anti-democratic obstructionists.

Attempts

to create a coalition government bringing together Christian
democrats, social democrats, and reactionary conservatives

16
will simply not do.

It may be possible to invite everyone

willing to renounce violence to participate in a genuinely
pluralist arrangement but only at the level of the regime,
not the government.

A government divided against itself can

not manag~ a process of democratic transition.
The pacts of political transition--like the pacts of the
Moncloa in Spain, the Pact of Punto Fijo in Venezuela, the
Pact of Sitges in Colombia, and others--involved a system of
mutual guarantees among ·the subscribers, a commitment to re
spect democratic norms, and to remain loyal to the regime
when in opposition.

By contrast, the Pact of Apaneca in El

Salvador has lacked the unequivocal support of the disloyal
rightists of the reactionary coalition.
remain disloyal to the democratic ideal.

They are and will
More importantly,

their continued obstructionist maneuvers have not been held
in check.
Prudence and discretion will not serve us well in cases
like these.

We hardly need these allies to establish a viable

and legitimate alternative to leftist totalitarianism.

We

have not been very imaginative evolving strategies to control
these reactionaries and we must be very clear about the ends
means relationship here.

If the crisis is to be solved peace

fully, this can only be done through a democratic transition.
We must help neutralize the violence of the disloyal rightists
of the reactionary coalition in order to fulfill the agenda
of democratic transition.

•
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Where We Stand
During most of 1983, Secretary of State George P. Shultz
put the United States on record in favor of democracy, reform
and the protection of human rights, economic development,
and the peaceful solution of the area ' s problems.

Taken

literally, these guidelines offer an a ttractive synthesis
of objectives that can be endorsed by a majority of the
American public.

Incidentally, vast segments of that public

still do not know which side we are really in favor of in
El Salvador _and in Nicaragua.
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The Reagan administration

has finally paid some attention to the efforts of the Conta
dora Group.

Special Envoy Richard Stone spent considerable

time contacting key actors throughout the area.

'
I

His initia

tives may have been overshadowed by the activities of the
National Bipartisan Commission, headed by former Secretary
of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger.

In t u rn, the Report of the

Commission is grounded on a fairly balanced, sober and
.
1 o f t h e origins
. .
· ·
lA
accurate appraisa
o f t h e crisis.

While

offering an attractive series of proposals, the CoITlITlission
assumes too many favorable preconditi ons which may not be
met, such as appropriate levels of economic assistance, and
the willingness and ability of Central American governments
19
. 1 ement re f ormist
.
.
to imp
po 1·icies.

While endorsing the

importance of human rights, the Commi ssion's Report offers
little guidance as to how the obstructionism of disloyal

•

rightists may be overcome.

An emphasis on the promotion

of democracy is also explicit in the recommendations

18
advanced by other interested parties, whether more representa
tive of the private sector or of the modal opinion in the

.

.

aca d emic community.
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There are very real limits to what we can do to promote
a democratic outcome in Central America.

To be sure, we

have been burned before trying to "export" democracy.

In

addition, both liberal and conservative sectors of opinion
in the United States remain unconvinced that democracy is
viable in Central America.

The former are not sure that

democratic procedure is that relevant in countries in such
a desperate need to satisfy more basic human rights.

Con

servatives aver that Western-style democracy cannot be brought
about overnight in the Third World.

I would counter by pass-

ing along the comment m~de to me by a Chilean socialist
during a recent_ day of ·national protest in his country.

He

said that, once you lose them, bourgeois liberties do not
seem so trivial anymore.
As a Hispanic American who has experienced totalitarian
and authoritarian forms of political domination, I would
suggest that we need to convince ourselves that the attempt
to promote democracy is neither naive nor misguided.

The

democratic framework provides the optimal structure of oppor
tunities for that "liberation" that protesters of arbitrary
rule in Central America have been talking about.

Socialism

remains very attractive from an ethical standpoint but is
yet to be able to evolve a synthesis with the democratic ideal.
By contrast, capitalism can solve the problem of production,

J
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at the expense of inequalitiei that can be managed and
ameliorated through the democratic framework.
To be sure much remains to be done and the instrumentali
ties assumed by alternatives extant will require considerably
more elaboration.

However, it appears that a consensus is

emerging on the exhaustion and historical and moral bank
ruptcy of reactionary despotism.

The issue, therefore, is

whether we can better promote democracy contributing to
reform Central American capitalism or being patient with
genuine efforts to maximize social equality that are not
predicated on a de~truction of the democratic framework.
A concern with genuine democratization, . therefore, could
finally appear as evidence of our informed awareness of
historical precedent in Central America.

An attempt to .

help Central Americans democratize their societies is
I

unquestionably interventionism but is at least an unequivocal
sign that we are prepared to treat them as equals .

•

Endnotes
1.

"The Conditions for Liberal Democracy in Latin Ainerica." '
Paper delivered at the XI International Meeting of the
Latin American Studies Association. Mexico City, 1983,
pp. 14-20.

2.

"U. S. Influence Upon the Central American Regional Crisis."
Paper delivered at the XI International Meeting of the
Latin American Studies Association. Mexico City, 1983, .
pp. 34-35.

3.

Pyramids of Sacrifice, Political Ethics and Social Change
(Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1976), chapter 1.

4.

"Central America: Toward a New Research Agenda." Review
article, Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs
(February 1984) .

5.

"Economic Development over the Long Run, Central America
Since 1920," Journal of Lati.n American Studies, XV, 2
(November 1983) .

6.

See "Reactionary Despotism in Central America," Journal
of Latin American Studies, XV, 2 (November 1983), Table 1,
pp. 302-303 for structural indicators and passim for ex
tended comments; and also "The Deterioration and Breakdown
of Reactionary Despotism in Central America." Paper
No. 2 Democracy in Latin America: Prospects and Implications.
Submitted to the Department of State in partial fulfillment
of contract 1722-020083 (August 1981), pp. 45-61 for the
analysis of economic performance.

7.

Op. cit.

8.

"The Rise and Fall of Liberalism in Central America:
Historical Perspectives on the Contemporary Crisis."
Paper delivered at the XI International Meeting of the
Latin American Studies Association. Mexico City, 1983,
p. 1.

9.

Politics in Central America (New York: Praeger, 1982),

)

'

p. 2.

10.

Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1968), p. 441.

11.

"The Vision of Democratic Capitalism," Public Opinion
(April/May, 1981), p.3.

.

21
12.

Baloyra, "Reactionary Despotism . . . " op. cit., p. 308.

13.

Jes~ Napoleon Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party
in Salvadoran Politics (Baton Rouge and London:
Louisiana State University Press, 1979), pp. x-xii.

14 .

Op. cit. , p. 4 .

15.

"Dictatorship and Double Standards," Commentary
LXVIII, 5 (November 1979).

16.

See for example "Toward a Framework for the Study of
Political Change in the Iberic Latin Tradition: The
Corporative Model," World Politics, XXV, 2 (January
1973),
206-235.

t

I

pp.

17.

Everett Carl Ladd, "Public Opinion on Central America,"
and "Central America, How Informed Are We?" in Public
Opinion (August/September, 1983), pp. 20, 41, and pp.
21-27, respectively.

18.

Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central
America (Washington, D. C.: January 1983), chapter 2.

19.

Ibid., pp. 45-49.

20.

I am referring here to The Miami Report (Miami, Florida:
January 1984), pp. 54-55, and to PACCA, Changing Course:
Blueprint for Peace in Central America and the Caribbean,
draft version, Section 3, pp. 19, 24, respectively.

CLEMSON UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

